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A U.S. Prosecutor's Access to Data Stored
Abroad - Are There Limits?
FREDERICK

T.

DAVIS*

Summary
On September 9, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
heard argument on an appeal by Microsoft that raises an important, and relatively unexplored, question relating to the conduct of transnational investigations: can a U.S. prosecutor obtain data-based information stored outside the United States without recourse to
an international agreement or convention, and without informing the country where the
data are stored?' The appellate court may or may not address the international consequences of its decision, which were incompletely addressed by the parties. Because the
issue will be a recurring one, it is useful to evaluate those consequences now.
The appeal is from an order by the District Court in the Southern District of New York
compelling Microsoft to turn over to the United States Attorney e-mails and data relating
to an unidentified customer of Microsoft (John Doe) who is the target of a criminal investigation. Microsoft resisted this order on the ground that John Doe had identified himself
as a citizen of Ireland when he opened his account; that under its normal policy Microsoft
keeps almost all data (including the content of any e-mails sent or received) of its customers on the server closest to the place of residence in order to minimize delays associated
with "latency;" that the relevant data relating to John Doe were thus stored on a server in
Ireland; and, that Microsoft disclaimed the legal obligation to obtain or produce data
stored on its server in Ireland, although it had the technical ability to do so. 2 A magistrate
judge ordered Microsoft to provide the information, and this decision was affirmed by a
judge of the district court. Microsoft's appeal has been supported by an unusually large
number of "friend of the court" briefs including from the Republic of Ireland, a Member
* Former Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York; Member of the Paris and
New York Bars. The author gratefully expresses his appreciation to Ryan Mullally, a third-year law student at
New York University School of Law, for his contributions to this article.
1. For a useful description of the argument, at which the author of this article was also present, see Alex
Ely, Second Circuit OralArgument in the Microsoft-Ireland Case:An Overview, LAWFAREBLOG (Sept. 10, 2015,
5:08 P.M.), www.lawfareblog.com/second-circuit-oral-argument-microsoft-ireland-case-overview?utm
source=dlvr.it&utmmedium=twitter. The panel reserved decision; a decision may issue at any time, but is
not likely until late 2015 or sometime in 2016.
2. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15
F.Supp.3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Magistrate Judge's Opinion].
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of Parliament of the European Union, a number of service providers (such as Apple, Ver3
izon, Accenture, and many others), as well as constitutional law groups.
This article will focus on a question that may or may not be addressed by the court of
appeals, but which will inevitably have a significant bearing on how its decision may be
received outside the United States: whether the district court's order complies with principles of international law, and in particular, with principles relating to the appropriate limits of a country's exercise of legislative, judicial, or police power when that exercise may
have an impact on another country's interests. This is important because a decision
widely understood as contravening international law-particularly if it is viewed as not
respecting principles that other countries would respect if the issue were to arise therecould lead to negative consequences, such as decreased cooperation in transnational criminal matters, or retaliation against U.S. law enforcement authorities or service providers.
Because of this focus, there are a number of issues vigorously discussed in the parties'
submissions and by the amici curiae that will not be addressed here, even though they are
important and could be dispositive of the appeal. The two principal issues not addressed
here are:
* The proper interpretation of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The SCA was
adopted by the U.S. Congress in the mid-1980s, before e-mail became the dominant
and ubiquitous form of communication that it is today. Many of the arguments made
to the magistrate judge and the district court concerned its proper interpretation.
This article will assume that however the court of appeals decides issues under the
SCA, its application to data stored in Ireland will be viewed by other countries as a
question of "extraterritoriality."
* The Constitution of the United States. Some of the friends of the court urge that protections provided in the U.S. Constitution, notably the Fourth Amendment's limitations on official searches and seizures, bear on the court's analysis. 4 Again, this article
offers no opinion on this question, but simply assumes that however the court deals
with domestic constitutional issues, the result should also be analyzed from an international legal perspective.
This article also assumes the procedural regularity of the prosecutorial process-that is,
that the prosecutor had a sufficient basis to seek the information held by Microsoft, and
followed appropriate criminal procedures in doing so.

I.

The Facts and Procedural History

The key facts and the procedural history of the Microsoft matter appear to be typical of
a situation capable of frequent iteration. They are relatively simple.
As noted, John Doe is being investigated by the federal prosecutor in New York for
possible violations of federal criminal laws. In the course of this investigation, the investi3. Microsoft Corp. Blogs, Business, Media and Civil Society Speak Up in Key Privacy Case,

OFFICIAL

MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/12/15/business-media-civil-soci-

ety-speak-key-privacy-case/.
4. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, et al. in Support of
Appellant, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, No. 14-2985-cv (filed Dec. 15, 2014), available at https://www.bren
nancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/141215%20-%20BCJ% 20Microsoft%20Ireland% 20Amicus% 20
%28FILED%29.pdf.
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gators learned that John Doe maintained a personal e-mail account with Microsoft. In
search of evidence or leads relevant to the investigation, the prosecutor decided to obtain
copies of John Doe's account information, including e-mails sent and received by him.
Obtaining information from third parties about a person under investigation is, of course,
a standard investigative procedure; requests to service providers for this purpose are made
5
constantly.
In the John Doe case, and pursuant to SCA procedures described in more detail below,
the prosecutor applied to a federal judge for, and was granted, a warrant that directed
Microsoft to produce to the prosecutor (without alerting John Doe) copies of all e-mails
stored in his account, all information relating to his identity (such as the name and addresses provided), and any other information stored therein (such as names and addresses
of correspondents). 6 As a frequent recipient of such official demands, Microsoft maintains
a criminal compliance office tasked with responding to them; this office has the technical
capacity to find and retrieve data maintained by its customers, even if the data are main7
tained outside the United States. The compliance office determined that John Doe had
identified himself as a resident of Ireland and that, consistent with standard Microsoft
policy, as well as to minimize performance delays caused by latency in the event of increased distance between user and server,8 John Doe's account was "hosted" on a server
maintained by Microsoft in Dublin, Ireland.9 As a result, all except a very small amount of
the data sought by the government's warrant did not exist on any U.S. server, but could
only be found in Ireland.1o The small amount of data maintained in the U.S. consisted of
information sufficient to identify the John Doe account and point to its location in Ireland, as well as a small amount of quality control information, but apparently did not
contain any content of investigative use to the prosecutor."
Upon learning of the location of the data, Microsoft informed the government that it
would provide the (essentially useless) U.S.-based information, but would not provide information from its Irish server, even though it had the technical ability to obtain it by
2
taking simple steps in the U.S. without apparent undue cost or difficulty.1 Upon the
refusal of the prosecutor to accept this, Microsoft filed a motion to quash the warrant on
the basis that it was not authorized by the SCA and that it called for an extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws, which was neither intended nor appropriate. 3 The magistrate

5. While agencies do not report the number of subpoenas they issue per year, the figure is thought to be
huge. For example, Wired reported that AT&T responded to 131,400 subpoenas for customer information in
the year 2011 alone. David Kravits, We Don'tNeed No Stinking Warrant:The Disturbing, Unchecked Rise of the
Administrative Subpoena, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/08/administravesubpoenas.
6. See Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468.
7. See id. at 466, 468.
8. In this context, latency refers to the risk of slower responsiveness in the use of e-mail (or other internet
functions) which may be caused by increased distance between user and server. See Margaret Rouse, Latency,
WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/latency (last updated Nov. 2014).
9. See Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 470.
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judge denied this application in a twenty-six page written opinion. His decision was reviewed by a judge on the district court, who affirmed it.14

II.

The Court's Decision

Much of the magistrate judge's opinion explored the SCA procedures for the prosecutor
to obtain the John Doe data. The Court noted that the SCA was an attempt by the U.S.
Congress to provide mechanisms to balance the largely opposing needs of, on one hand,
governmental access to information in criminal and other contexts, and, on the other
hand, the privacy rights of individuals." Since the SCA was adopted at a time when data
storage was in a relative infancy, it speaks in general terms and does not, for example,
single out e-mails for specific treatment. It nonetheless provides a straightforward approach to the basic circumstance presented in the John Doe case by offering the prosecutor three different procedures to obtain personal information, each with a different burden
of proof and judicial oversight depending on the intrusiveness of the inquiry.
The simplest procedure is for the prosecutor to issue an administrative subpoena, which
the prosecutor can easily do in the name of the grand jury, in order to compel the information holder (such as Microsoft) to produce designated information.16 The prosecutor
can issue such a subpoena without any judicial intervention, and without any specific demonstration of need.17 But under the SCA, the subpoena approach has some very important
limitations:
* It permits the prosecutor to only obtain basic customer information, unopened emails more than 180 days old, and opened e-mails;1 and
* The prosecutor must give notice to the customer, although notice may be delayed for
up to ninety days upon the written certification of a supervisory official;19
* If the prosecutor delays giving notice, he or she may request a court order barring the
20
internet service provider (ISP) from notifying the customer for a like period.
The prosecutor can alternatively ask a judge to issue a court order, which permits access
to further information in addition to that available under a subpoena, including a history
of all e-mails sent or received by the customer (although not their content). The court
order procedure differs from the issuance of a subpoena in certain respects:
* The prosecutor cannot issue it unilaterally, but must demonstrate to a judge "specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe" that the
14. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-MailAccount Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., Nos. M9150, 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014) (slip copy) [hereinafter District Court
Opinion].
15. See Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
16. Id. at 468.
17. In the federal system, a recipient can challenge a subpoena on the ground that "compliance would be
unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CRm. P. 17(c)(2).
18. As noted, the SCA does not specifically mention "e-mails" as such, but rather talks about different
varieties of "stored data." The application of the SCA to e-mails, and development of the distinctions noted
here relating to age and status as "opened" or "unopened" resulted from judicial interpretation. See Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d at 469 n. 2. See generally O.S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1208 (2004).
19. Kerr, supra note 18, at 1233.
20. Id.

VOL. 49, NO. 1

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ARE THERE LIMITS?

5

information sought will be "relevant and material to an on-going criminal investigation"; 2 1 and
The prosecutor must provide notice to the affected party. Such notice cannot be
delayed unilaterally, but can be delayed by court order and the judge can again bar
22
the ISP from notifying the client/subscriber for a like period.
Finally, the SCA permits the prosecutor to ask a judge to issue a warrant, which permits
the prosecutor to obtain, in addition to information obtainable under a court order, unopened e-mails stored for less than 180 days, without informing the account holder.23
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge can issue a warrant only upon the
prosecutor showing probable cause of a belief that the information sought will provide
evidence of a crime or the fruits thereof-a somewhat higher standard than the reasonable
grounds necessary to obtain a court order. 24 Neither the SCA nor the Federal Rules
require notice to the customer for the execution of such warrants.
None of the SCA provisions summarized here specifically addresses their intended extraterritorial reach-that is, whether they should or should not apply when responsive
information is located outside the United States.

III.

The Court's Reasoning

Microsoft's principal argument was appropriately described by the magistrate judge as
"simple, perhaps deceptively so." 25 It argued that, under accepted jurisprudence, a warrant issued under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is limited to the
territory of the United States and cannot be exercised outside of it; thus, the warrant
issued here could not be executed upon data found in Ireland.26 Magistrate Judge Francis
rejected this argument.2 7 His principal bases for doing so were two:
* First, he noted the traditional basis for restricting the execution of a warrant to U.S.
territory. Historically, a warrant authorizes a law enforcement officer to enter a
physical place (such as a home or place of business); thus, in that context, it would be
clearly inappropriate for such an officer to do so outside the United States. 28 Here,
he reasoned, no official act would take place outside the U.S. at all because the warrant called for Microsoft to obtain, and then produce, the requested information
29
while staying in the United States.
* Second, he noted that, historically, both subpoenas and court orders applicable to
lesser intrusions, as noted above, were not limited to information located within the
2 1. Id.
22. Id. at 1234.
23. Id. at 1218.
24. The Sixth Circuit held that to the extent the SCA purports to allow the government warrantless access
to e-mail content, it is unconstitutional. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). The
Warshak ruling has not been tested in the Supreme Court, which suggests that agencies have largely conformed to the decision and sought out SCA "warrants" rather than subpoenas or court orders.
25. Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d at 470.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 473.
29. Id. at 472.
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United States.3 0 It has long been the law, for example, that a person or corporation
located in the U.S. must respond to a subpoena calling for information located
outside the U.S. if it "controls" that information, i.e. is legally and physically able to
access and produce it.31 Reasoning that the warrant was in fact a "hybrid" structure,
the Court concluded that there is no reason to believe that the Congress intended a
broad extraterritorial reach for subpoenas and court orders, but a much more re32
stricted one for warrants.

In a short concluding section of its opinion entitled "Principles of Extraterritoriality",
the magistrate judge reasoned that concerns relating to the application of U.S. laws
outside the country's borders "are simply not present here."3 3 He noted that the Mordson34 and Kiobel35 Supreme Court decisions created a strong presumption that U.S. legislation applies only within the country's borders, absent a showing of legislative intent
otherwise, and implicitly acknowledged that nothing in the SCA specifically evidenced an
intent that it should apply outside U.S. borders.36 He nonetheless concluded that Morrson and Kiobel do not apply because Microsoft was located in the United States and would
comply with the warrant without leaving the United States or committing any act outside
of it: the warrant "places obligations only on the service provider [that is, Microsoft] to act
within the United States." 37 The Court ended its discussion of extraterritoriality noting
that: "[A]n SCA warrant does not criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign country; it
does not involve the deployment of American law enforcement personnel abroad; it does
not require even the physical presence of service provider employees at the location where
38
data are stored."
IV.

A.

Discussion
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: LEGAL LtiMITs ON THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY

The Microsoft appeal implicates classic principles of international law defining the limits of the territorial reach of a country's laws and their execution, and requires their application to relatively recent-and fundamentally disruptive-technological and commercial
realities that did not exist when the prevailing rules relating to extraterritoriality were
developed.39 As will be discussed below, rules relating to sovereignty and its limits
emerged from contexts implying a close and intuitively obvious link between the activity
to be regulated and the actual place (or territory) involved.40 When applied to data held in
the "cloud" and frequently stored on servers physically located in locations distant from
30. Id. at 471-72.
31. See, e.g., Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983).
32. Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d at 471-72.
33. Id. at 475.
34. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
35. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
36. See Magistrate Judge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d at 475-76.
37. Id. at 476.
38. Id. at 475.
39. This article addresses "international law" only in the context of the extraterritorial reach of a country's
powers. International legal principles may also apply to the rights of individuals. That topic is not addressed
in the present article.
40. See 2 M. CHERIF BAssIoum, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 158 (3d ed. 2008) (footnote omitted).
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activity that one country may wish to regulate, classic rules of international law may be
difficult to apply, and may require sophisticated analysis of the principles at stake.
The limits of a state's right to project its laws or powers extraterritorially are sometimes
viewed as having three components: the "power to prescribe," that is, the power to adopt
laws affecting conduct; the "power to adjudicate," consisting of the power of a country's
courts to issue valid decisions relating to the questions and persons before them; and the
"power to execute," which refers to the power to enforce laws or judgments.4 1 These
powers belong to the sovereign, and traditionally have been limited to the sovereign's
territory:
The powers to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce derive from sovereignty; thus, the
exercise of national criminal jurisdiction has traditionally been linked, if not limited,
to the territory of a state and, by extension, to the territory under the dominion and
control of a given legal authority exercising de jure or de facto sovereign
prerogatives.

42

All three elements of sovereignty may be implicated when a prosecutor seeks information stored abroad: doing so implicates the power of Congress to apply provisions of the
SCA (and of U.S. criminal laws generally) outside the territory of the U.S.; the adjudicatory power of U.S. courts (among other things, to issue warrants or court orders that may
have impacts beyond U.S. borders); and the power of enforcement agencies to enforce the
SCA, the warrants issued by US courts, and other mechanisms that may be involved in
43
official pursuit of data stored outside the U.S.
In a general but very important sense, all three limits on the exercise of sovereignty rest
on two principal concepts: that application of one country's laws outside of its territory
must be based on a reasonable and valid state interest; and, secondarily, that its interpretation and execution must take into account the reasonable and valid interests of other
states. The jurisprudence developing these principles has developed from two principal
conclusions:
* Every state is considered to have the power to address conduct that takes place on its
44
terrtory, whether done by a citizen or not.
* Every state is considered to have the power to address the conduct of its citizens,
45
whether or not that conduct takes place on its territory.
While simple in theory, both principles have evolved in ways that raise particular questions in the context of the Microsoft appeal.
The principle of territoriality has been expanded by the so-called "effects test." This
approach expands the valid exercise of state power beyond addressing acts committed on its
territory to include acts the effects of which (even if committed overseas) are felt on a
state's territory. 46 The classic example of this analysis is a cartel where the participants
41.

§ 401
1987) (hereinafter "RESTATEMENT THIRD").
42. See 2 BASSIOUNI, spra note 40.
43. See RESTATEMENT THIRD §§ 401-02.
44. See S.S. Lotus (Turk v. Fr.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), [ 45.
45. RESTATEMENT THIRD §§ 402, 421.
46. See 2 BASSIOUNI, spra note 40, at 160 (This is sometimes referred to as the principle of "objective
territoriality" or "passive personality").
Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs

(AM. LAW INST.
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may enter into, and execute, an agreement to fix prices without ever setting foot in a
country that nonetheless would suffer the economic consequences of an illegal agreement. 47 The effects test was developed in U.S. jurisprudence to investigate and prosecute
overseas cartels, and was approached warily by countries in Europe; 4 8 more recently
courts and administrative agencies in the European Union have generally adopted the
49
concept.
While external application of national laws on the basis of citizenship raise few questions when applied to natural persons, it becomes increasingly complicated when applied
to corporations (and other synthetic "persons") because the citizenship (generally understood to be the place of incorporation or its principal place of business) of a company can
be adjusted almost at whim by its owners through myriad means of incorporation of parents and subsidiaries, and other corporate relationships.

V.

Technical & Commercial Developments That Affect the Analysis

Changes in technology over the last generation have, self-evidently, been vast; they will
surely continue into the future. One general phenomenon bears emphasis here, which
may be called the phenomenon of "deterritorialization" or "delocalization." Traditionally,
laws and traditions protecting privacy have focused on principles linked to a physical place
or terrtory. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, refers to "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."s 0
The reference in the same Amendment to the requirement of a "warrant" as a prerequisite
to seizing a person or thing, and the insistence that it not be issued other than upon
"probable cause," had a clear territorial, or physical, reference: whether to detain a "person," enter a "home," or seize a "paper" or "effect"-all required physical access to a
specific place." It is thus clear why, traditionally, and as set forth in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a warrant could not have any effectiveness outside of
the territory of the United States-precisely because a warrant contemplated that a state
actor (such as the police) would act in a physical place (the location of a person or a thing),
it seems obvious that its execution could not occur outside of the territory of the United
52
States without infringing on the sovereign rights of another country. As one oft-quoted
47. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d. Cir. 1945) (considered to be the first example
in US law of the modern effects test). For a discussion of the effects test under US law see Kathleen Hixson,
Extra Territorial]urisdiction Under the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 127 (1988).
48. Hixson, supra note 47, at 139-140.
49. See Kenneth S. Gallant, ]urisdiction to Adjudicate and ]urisdiction to Prescribe in International Criminal
Courts, 48 VILL. L. Rrv. 763, n.214 (2003), for a list of cases in multiple nations around the world where
versions of the "effects test" have been applied. For a discussion of the effects test under the law of the

European Union, see Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, The ExtraterritorialApplication ofAmerican Law: Myths and Realities, EN TEMPs RSEL 1, 11-14 (2014), https://lct2013.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/extraterritoriality-paperanglais-final.pdf.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 1. Id.
52. In, In re TerroristBombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afica, 552 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second
Circuit noted that "seven justices of the Supreme Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
278 (1990) endorsed the view that U.S. courts are not empowered to issue warrants for foreign searches."
MagistrateJudge's Opinion, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (further holding that such limitations only apply to conven-
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opinion put it, one state "may not exercise its powers in any form in the territory of
53
another state."
In the eighteenth century and well into the twentieth, information was stored in "papers," very much linked to the "place" where papers were stored. The early phases of the
computer revolution and the storage of information as digitized data did not cause a huge
change in this traditional frame of reference, because data were initially stored on fixed
media such as floppy disks and hard drives; those media-much like "papers"-had a
physical location, and it did not cause too much difficulty to adapt Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and rules relating to searches and seizures, to them. 54 Furthermore, as a
practical matter people (including suspected criminals) tended to store information in a
physically-and thus local-accessible place, and could generally not hide incriminating
information abroad.55
The explosion of cheap and high-speed data transmission together with radically reduced costs of storage changes this. As one writer recently observed, "the infrastructure
of the internet means that data are not territorially bound."5 6 While people continue to
store data on local hard drives and memory sticks, data are increasingly stored at the very
least on a "network" of linked computers and often in "the Cloud."5 7 The Cloud, in turn,
may consist of any number of different phenomena, sometimes in tandem, including the
following:
* Data may be stored on a server that is extremely remote from the persons storing
(and later getting access to) the data; this may include storage in a completely differ58
ent country.
* Casual users of the Cloud may not know or care where their data are stored, but
someone seeking anonymity can deliberately choose a remote location where thirdparty access is restricted or protected by local law or custom. 59
* Due to the low cost of data storage and the need for security, there are often auto60
matic backups so that the same data appear simultaneously in more than one place.

tional warrants, not SCA hybrid warrants which do not interfere with foreign territory the same way); see also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
53. S.S. Lotus 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, [ 45.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. Id.
56. DAVID ANDERSON, A QUESTION OF TRUST: REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWERs REVIEw 51
(June 11, 2015), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-question-of-trust-report-of-theinvestigatory-powers-review.
57. Id.
58. Mathieu Gorge, The Implicationsfor Storage of EUDataProtection Regulation, COMPUTER WKLY. (Aug.
2012), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/The-implications-for-storage-of-EU-data-protectionregulaton.
59. See id.
60. Paper and other traditional forms of information storage can, of course, be copied. The differences
between paper and data copying are primarily two: a copy of data is remarkably cheap to make, store, and
retrieve; and, while a "copy" of a physical document is almost always different in some way from the "original," generally speaking there is no such distinction between the "original" and the "copy" of digitized information-they are literally identical.
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* At least with respect to data in transit, a "document" or other piece of information
may be broken into "packets" of data and routed separately to a destination where
they are reassembled.61
* While encrypting physical documents is difficult and expensive, encrypting digitized
62
data is not.

Still, further disassociation of data from territory may be possible. Some data storage
companies have already spoken of creating "data farms" on the high seas where, at least in
63
theory, the physical location of the data is not subject to any country's jurisdiction; it is
even possible to imagine storing data on satellites in space.
Separately, technology offers a different threat to law enforcement authorities if data
storage companies adopt and make available to their customers the fruits of so-called
"public-key cryptography" technology: Data companies could easily advertise that their
customers can choose an encryption system where the "key" to reopen encrypted communications is retained by the customer alone. 64 Under this scenario, an ISP confronted with
a warrant could hand over encrypted data, but neither the ISP nor the investigator could
decrypt it.65 This would permit encryption that, under current technology, cannot be
broken (or at least cannot be broken without an undue expenditure of time or resources),
and thus access by a State to information stored by a customer could not be had from the
storage provider at all, irrespective of the legal procedure followed or the demonstration
of need.
The "delocalization" of data may have limits as countries try to protect data stored in
them by laws inhibiting use of the Cloud or other technologies that contribute to delocalization. Whether or not such laws increase and are effective, is open to question; 66 and, in
any event, as a practical and commercial matter, remote Cloud storage appears to be increasing rapidly.67
Analysis of international law principles depends in part on weighing the respective interests of participants to determine whether there is any true conflict between the legally
protected interests of different countries, and to weigh them. The participants whose
interests apply to the Microsoft case are the "Requesting Country", the United States,
acting through the federal prosecutor); the "Host Country", Ireland, where the relevant
data are stored; the "Owner" of the data, John Doe; and the "Internet Service Provider"
(ISP), Microsoft.68

61. Anderson supra note 56, at 51.
62. Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-Incrimination in the

DigitalEra, 15 U.

PA. J. CONST.

L. 11, 22 (2011).

63. MagistrateJudge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp. 3d at475 (citing Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based
Server Farms and InternationalLaw, 43 U. CONN. L. REv. 709, 716-18 (2011)).
64. Glenn Fleishman, How to Keep Your EmailPrivate with PGP Encryption on Your Mac, MACWORLD (Mar.
2, 2015), http://www.macworld.com/article/2890537/how-to-keep-your-email-private-with-pgp-encryphonon-your-mac.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (a guide for new users of public-key cryptography tools).
65. See id.
66. See Daniel Castro, The False Promise of Data Nationalism, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
9, 2013), http://www.itif.org/publicadons/2013/12/09/false-promise-data-naonalism.
67. See id.
68. MagistrateJudge's Opinion, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468.
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REQUESTING COUNTRY

The obvious and legitimate interest of the prosecutor is to obtain information in aid of
his or her investigation. 69 It is essentially irrelevant to the prosecutor where that information is stored. Thus, the interest of the prosecutor is no less and no more legitimate with
respect to data stored overseas than with respect to information traditionally obtained
through "search and seizure" procedures domestically. The United States does have a
secondary interest in maintaining good diplomatic relations with other countries, from
which it may seek cooperative help in criminal investigations, and thus in observing international rules, since rejecting them may diminish cooperation.

B.

THE INTEREST OF THE HOST COUNTRY

The interest of the host country is perhaps the most important to evaluate, because it
touches on principles of sovereignty and will likely be an important factor in the legal,
economic, or diplomatic reactions that a decision might cause.
While Ireland submitted a brief as amicus cuiae in the Microsoft appeal, it did not
specifically take a position on how the Court of Appeals should rule; nor did it explicitly
state its interest in the matter. 70 Its principal purpose was to express its willingness to
fulfill all its obligations under its Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the U.S., and to
bring to the Court's attention a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ireland relating
to access to bank data held abroad.71 Evaluating the inherent interests of any country
hosting data that may be sought by US procedures is nonetheless critical to a reasoned
analysis.
The record is incomplete with respect to two issues of possible relevance. 72 First, it is
unclear the extent to which John Doe is, in fact, a citizen or resident of Ireland. While he
indicated on an application for a Microsoft account that he resided there, this was not
verified.73 Second, and more broadly, it is unclear whether John Doe's activities under
investigation had any link to Irish territory, apart from the claimed residence of the owner
74
and the fact that Microsoft chose to store his e-mail data there.
Depending on these two variables, one could construct hypothetical situations where
the host country's interests could be quite different:
* It is possible that Mr. Doe is not only an Irish citizen, but that all of his activities
relevant to the U.S. investigation took place in Ireland; or, alternatively
* It is also possible that he is a U.S. and not an Irish citizen; that he has never even
been in Ireland; that all his potentially criminal acts (including e-mail correspondence) took place in the United States; and, that his e-mail data are stored in Ireland
only because he lied in providing account opening information to Microsoft.
69. Id.
70. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Ireland, at 3, MagistrateJudge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(No. 14-2985) (filed Dec. 8, 2014), available at http://digitalconstitution.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
Ireland-Amicus-Brief.pdf.
7 1. Id.
72. Magistrate]udge's Opinion, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 475.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Mr. Doe also could have been an Irish participant in a criminal gang or enterprise
located principally in the U.S.: without leaving Ireland; he could have worked with
co-conspirators operating in the U.S. by (for example) receiving the financial fruits of
their crime and laundering it in Ireland.

In the first and third hypotheticals, Ireland might claim a genuine interest in protecting
the privacy of one of its citizens. In the second, it is more difficult to determine Ireland's
real interest in the John Doe case specifically, but it may have more general concern about
U.S. access to data stored in Ireland.
Viewed generally, a host country may have interests in data stored within its territory,
irrespective of the question of citizenship or territory-based activity:
* First, a host country may have an economic interest in encouraging "data farms" on
its territory, which could be expected to bring some revenue, and would worry that
its reputation for such activities would be adversely affected by perceptions that data
75
stored there can be accessed from outside the country.
* Second, and much more importantly, it will certainly have a general, but important,
concern about its "sovereignty," and may well take offense to a ruling by a U.S. court
that any company that stores its data in Ireland can be forced to turn over that data to
U.S. prosecutors without going through formal diplomatic channels, and thus that
76
data stored in Ireland can be produced overseas without Ireland even knowing.
The terms of some mutual legal assistance treaties and legislation relating to international data transfer provide insight into the sovereign interest of a country in data stored
on its territory:
* A number of countries have adopted so-called "blocking statutes," the purpose of
which is to prohibit the transfer of information outside of the country without going
through international conventions or agreements that, at a minimum, provide authorities in the host country with notice of any request for information and the op77
portunity to exercise control over the release of such data outside of its territory.
Under the Court's existing ruling in the Microsoft case, no host country would even
have a right to be informed if a company storing data on their territory were obligated to turn such data over to a U.S. prosecutor, thus eviscerating the effect of
78
national legislation such as the "blocking" statutes.
* A number of international treaties clearly contemplate some degree of supervision or
control by a host country over access to data stored there. For example, Article
9(2)(a) of the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union
and the United States of America, signed in 2003, provides that the host country (or,
as used in the Agreement, the "requested country") to whom a request for mutual
assistance is made may add certain "limitations" on information transferred "to pro-

75. Id.
76. See id.
77. For example, France's so-called "Blocking Statute" makes it a crime to transfer certain kinds of information outside of France for use in an "administrative or judicial proceeding" other than pursuant to international agreements or conventions. See Grosdidier, The French Blocking Statute, the Hague Evidence Convention,
and the Case Law: Lessons for French PartiesResponding to American Discovery, 50 TEx. INT'L LJ.F. 11 (2014).
78. Id.
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tect personal and other data." 79 An "explanatory note" to this Article makes it clear
that the host country must be in a position to make a case-by-case determination of
the need for such protection in order to avoid an overbroad or inflexible rule.80
Article 9(2)(b) is meant to ensure that refusal of assistance on data protection grounds
may be invoked only in exceptional cases.81 Such a situation could arise if, upon balancing
the important interests involved in the particular case (on the one hand, public interests,
including the sound administration of justice and, on the other hand, privacy interests)
furnishing the specific data sought by the requesting State would raise difficulties so fundamental as to be considered by the requested State to fall within the essential interests
grounds for refusal. A broad, categorical, or systematic application of data protection
principles by the requested State to refuse cooperation is therefore precluded. Thus, the
fact the requesting and requested States have different systems of protecting the privacy of
data (such as, that the requesting State does not have the equivalent of a specialized data
protection authority) or have different means of protecting personal data (such as, that the
requesting State uses means other than the process of deletion to protect the privacy or
the accuracy of the personal data received by law enforcement authorities), may, as such,
82
not be imposed as additional conditions under Article 9(2)(a).
This provision-found in an important treaty between the US and Europe relating to
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters-clearly shows that both the United States and
the countries in the European Union think that they have a say about whether to allow the
transfer of data out of their respective countries. This interest would be thoroughly undermined by the current ruling in the Microsoft case, since it would permit the transfer of
data out of Ireland without Ireland even being aware of the request or the transfer.

C.

THE OWNER

John Doe may have two distinct and different interests: he has a personal privacy interest in resisting disclosure of his personal information, but he also has an interest in procedural regularity with respect to a criminal investigation of him.
From all that appears in the record, it seems that John Doe has no basis under U.S. law
to contest the adequacy of the procedures used to obtain his information: Under the SCA
and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor must have
demonstrated to the satisfaction of a neutral judge that there was "probable cause" to
conclude that John Doe was responsible for a federal crime, and that evidence in his email account would shed light on this.83 The public record does not disclose what that
showing of probable cause was; for present purposes, the only appropriate presumption is
one of regularity, that is, that a sufficient showing was made. While that showing was not
one to which John Doe had the opportunity to oppose, under U.S. procedures he would
79. Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the United States of America and the European
Union, E.U.-U.S., art. 9(2)(a),June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.1 [hereinafter Agreement on Mutual Legal
Assistance].
80. Explanatory Note on the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the United States of America
and the European Union, E.U.-U.S., 3, June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.1.
81. Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, supra note 79, art. 9(2)(b).
82. Id., art. 9(2)(a)
83. See FED. R. CRurm. P. 41.
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get that opportunity if he is indicted and the fruits of an e-mail search were offered against
him. On the present record, it is difficult to see how Mr. Doe could argue that Irish
rather than U.S. standards should be used to evaluate whether he has been treated fairly.
If John Doe was a legitimate target of a US criminal prosecution-that is, if the U.S. was
"competent" to proceed against him-he would have no basis to argue that because of his
Irish citizenship, or other non-U.S. contacts, he was protected by non-U.S. rules. Otherwise put, there is no international principle that suggests that prosecutors have to follow
84
different rules when the target of their investigation is not a U.S. citizen.
Under U.S. law, John Doe would not appear to have a separately enforceable means of
protecting his privacy interests, other than by means of seeking suppression of the fruits of
illegally obtained information in the event he is prosecuted. To the extent that he may
have privacy rights under Irish law, his interests would thus merge with those of Ireland,
which would enforce those laws.
D.

THE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER

The real interest of the ISP, in this case Microsoft, appears to be primarily commercial.85 While Microsoft has vigorously pursued this appeal emphasizing the procedural
restraints on governmental authority necessary to protect the privacy rights of its customers 86-a theme also emphasized in the many amicus briefs filed by other commercial enterprises-the only basis for a non-vicarious (or non-altruistic) interest is the perceived
risk of a competitive disadvantage if it is ordered to turn over John Doe's Irish data. 7 As
the trial judge noted in his opinion, Microsoft is a large American company with the
acknowledged technical ability to easily obtain the data that it elects to store overseas. 88
Microsoft (and similarly situated U.S. companies that appear as amici) are clearly concerned that an adverse ruling will be interpreted by potential customers to mean their data
are not safe with an American service provider who can easily be forced to share data with
the prosecutor, irrespective of the location of those data;8 9 U.S. companies, in fact, appear
84. A non-citizen may have certain rights under diplomatic conventions applicable to the country where he
is arrested, but that would not affect such a non-citizen's rights during an investigative phase.
85. See Brief for Appellant, Magistrate]udge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-2985)
(filed Dec. 8, 2014), available at https://www.eff.org/files/2014/12/12/microsoft_opening-brief.pdf.
86. Microsoft's standing may be questioned. On July 21, 2015, the Appellate Division, First Department,

of the Supreme Court of the State of New York ruled on an application by Facebook seeking an order that it
should not have to respond to 381 "search warrants" served on it by the District Attorney seeking customer
information, arguing a variety of privacy-related and overbreadth issues. The District Attorney challenged
Facebook's "standing" to contest the application for the warrants. Without using the word "standing", the
Appellate Division dismissed Facebook's appeal, noting that the real privacy interests were those of
Facebook's customers, and that those interests were sufficiently addressed by the ability of the customers to
seek suppression at trial of any fruits of improperly issued warrants. The case did not involve any international or extraterritorial issues. Microsoft joined a brief filed as amicus curiae supporting Facebook. In re 381
Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. v. N.Y. Cty. Dist. Attorney's Offfice, 132 A.D.3d 11, 14
N.Y.S.3d 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
87. See, e.g., Brief for AT&T Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 2, Magistrate]udges
Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-2985), available at https://www.eff.org/files/2014/12/15/
att microsoft ireland amicusbrief.pdf.
88. MagistrateJudge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d 467, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
89. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 85, at 17; see, e.g., Brief for AT&T Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant, spra note 87.
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to suffer from a lack of trust from clients and potential clients, especially since the disclosures made by Edward Snowden in June 2013 revealed the extent to which U.S. ISPs are
forced to share data with national agencies. 9 0 A broadly worded adverse ruling could also
damage their business by leading to scenarios where a U.S. court might hold them in
contempt if they do not produce the requested data, when, at the same time, production of
such data would be a punishable offence in the nation where the data are hosted.

VI.

The Parties' Legal Positions

The outcomes proposed by the federal prosecutor and by Microsoft could not be more
diametrically opposed.

A.

THE POSITION OF THE

U.S.

GOVERNMENT

The prosecutor argues that the issue is very simple because the courts have already
ruled that any entity that is "present" in the United States (or that is subject to its personal
jurisdiction) can be ordered to produce any data that it "controls," irrespective of the
92
9
location of those data. 1 This position was essentially adopted by the District Court. It
raises a few questions:
While much of the discussion about the case has focused on the obvious fact that
Microsoft is a large, and indeed iconic, American enterprise, the government's position, if
adopted, would not be limited to U.S. companies. Rather, it would apply to any company
over which the prosecutor can convince a court that it has power to enter a binding and
enforceable order-that is, as to which the courts can exercise the "power to adjudicate." 93
While the breadth of this ruling might assuage somewhat of a concern that American
companies would be singled out and thus suffer a competitive disadvantage, it may be
difficult for non-U.S. companies to determine whether their activities in the United States
in fact subject them to American personal jurisdiction, and some may be legitimately surprised by the exercise of U.S. "long arm" jurisdiction over them. It is, in fact, often difficult to determine the extent to which courts may exercise "personal jurisdiction" over
parties based upon their activity on the internet. 94 Concerns about vulnerability to U.S.
demands for data stored outside the United States may well convince non-U.S. ISPs not
to compete in the United States by offering services there, or otherwise maintaining a
"presence" in the United States.
The position of the United States government is particularly troublesome because it
fails to recognize any legitimate interest at all in the countries where the data it seeks may
be found. In taking this position, the prosecutor echoes the conclusion of the District
90. MARY MADDEN, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY & SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, PEW

3 (2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PIPublicPerceptionsofPrivacyi 1
1214.pdf.
91. Brief for Appellee at 8, Magistrate]udge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-2985)
(filed Mar. 9, 2015).
92. Magistrate]udge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d at 474.
93. Brief for Appellee, supra note 91.
94. See, e.g., Pierre Grosdidier, When Internet Libel Lands You in an Out-of-State Court, LAw360 (Apr. 24,
2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/647249/when-internet-libel-lands-you-in-an-out-of-statecourt.
RES. CTR.
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Court, quoted above, that the Court's order does not raise "extraterritorial concerns" because it does not compel any activity to take place on foreign soil.95 This reasoning, however, does not take into account the efjZcts of the Court's order, which definitely would be
felt on foreign soil to the extent that data found exclusively on it are produced in the
United States, because it would deprive the host country of the ability to make a determination 96-expressly permitted by the U.S./E.U. Treaty, for example 97-whether a requested transfer violated its privacy or other laws. As noted, a purely "territorial" analysis
has already evolved to consider the interest of the country where the effects are felt, and
not just those where the acts took place.98 While invoked as a basis to justify expanded
U.S. authority to rule on activity taking place outside of the territory of the United States,
it would logically imply that an appropriate exercise of that authority should consider the
effects of U.S.-based activity that are felt elsewhere. 99 In a different context, when high
tech criminals located outside the United States target U.S. victims by "hacking" or other
means, they do so without in any way taking acts inside the United States; but, it is intuitively obvious that their acts implicate U.S. sovereignty (and thus the right of the U.S. to
regulate or prosecute) because the "effects" of their acts are recognized there. It would
thus appear logical that U.S. jurisprudence should consider the "effects" of its decisions
outside the U.S.

B.

THE POSITION OF MICROSOFT

Microsoft's position, supported by many amici curiae, is that the only means by which a
United States prosecutor should be able to obtain data stored abroad is through an international treaty, bilateral agreement, or other state-to-state mechanism.1 0 0 In so arguing,
Microsoft appears to take for granted the interest of the host country. The rule it proposes, however, is both overbroad and inflexible and thus treats in the same way situations
that may be quite different. One could imagine a situation involving the following hypothetical elements:
* An individual, we will name James Doe, is a U.S. citizen who is part of an organized
U.S.-based criminal gang. Aware that e-mails, while useful to his nefarious plans,
may be recovered through investigative means, James selects a non-U.S. ISP known
to be based in, and to store its data in, the territory of a country that has no MLAT or
similar agreement with the United States, and with which the United States has bad
diplomatic relations. In filling out his account opening form, Mr. Doe lies and says
that he is a citizen of the country hosting the service.
* Without once leaving the United States, Mr. Doe constantly uses his e-mail to reach
out to fellow gang members, and also uses it to defraud victims-in short, his e-mail
use in the United States generates very compelling proof of his crimes. But he carefully "wipes" his computers, so that the only place where the content of these communications can be found is on the server in the hostile country.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Magistrate]udge's Opinion, 15 F.Supp.3d at 475.
See Brief for Appellant, spra note 85, at 59.
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, supra note 79, art. 13.
Gallant, supra note 49.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 91, at 26.
See Brief for Appellant, spra note 85, at 12, 49, 58.
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'

Under Microsoft's analysis, it would appear that the prosecutor would be almost powerless to obtain these data, and would be reduced to applying diplomatic pressure to negotiate with the hostile foreign state.' 0

VII.
A.

An Approach that Conforms with International Legal Principles
THE SCOPE OF THE COURT's REVIEW

A threshold issue (raised by the judges during oral argument, see supra note 1) is to
identify the Court's role in interpreting the SCA and the criminal procedures followed
here.
The prosecutor posits that the law in this area is settled, and that the Court should
simply apply it. He relies in large part on two well-known principles.
First, he notes the following observation by the Court of Appeals nearly fifty years ago:
It is no longer open to doubt that a federal court has the power to require the production of documents located in foreign countries if the court has in personam jurisdiction
of the person in possession or control of the material.102
And second, he notes that the same court has often emphasized that "[t]he test for the
production of documents is control, not location." 0 3
This and similar precedent, in fact, would seem to support the prosecutor's position
that when a judicial order is enforceable on a corporation or person acting in the United
States, and is not an authorization to an officer to act outside of it (as with a traditional
"warrant"), the issuing court need not consider the interests of the country where the data
are stored. There are several reasons, however, why the Court should pause before
mechanically applying this precedent.
First, virtually all of the "worldwide subpoena" cases such as Marc Rich involve bank or
other commercial data. 0 4 Extending Marc Rich precedent to searches for private e-mails
risks precisely the sort of intrusion into personal privacy that is a matter of intense international sensitivity, and that is the basis of international agreements protecting such interests, including those that address international requests for mutual aid in criminal
investigations as noted above. 0 5
Second, the Morrson and Kiobel decisions in the Supreme Court reflect a real seachange in the role of the courts in interpreting legislative mandates that touch on non-US
interests. In each case, the Court revisited what it repeatedly called "judge-made rules,"
which were prior-often very well settled-decisions permitting extraterritorial application of legislation that was itself silent on whether it should apply outside of the United
States. 0 6 The unambiguous message of the two decisions is that such precedent will be
reviewed to scrutinize whether they reflected an actual and expressed legislative intent. As
the Kiobel court emphasized:
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 17.
U.S. v. First Nat. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. (quoting In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983)).
See, e.g., In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663.
See id.
See generally Morrison, 561 U.S. 247; see also Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. 1659.
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For us to run interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must
be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has
the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the
possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.
The presumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary
does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy
07
consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.

On this basis, the Court concluded bluntly: "When a statute gives no clear indication of
an extraterritorial application, it has none."108
It bears emphasis that not only the SCA but all of the legislative acts discussed in the
decisions upon which the Prosecutor relies, including Marc Rich and its progeny, were
silent on the question of their extra-territorial application.1 09 The decisions permitting a
"worldwide subpoena" do not reflect expressed legislative intent, but are precisely the sort
of "judge-made rules" that the opinions in Morison and Kiobel felt constrained to revisit.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to overturn nearly a half century of settled law in the Second Circuit regarding the extraterritorial reach of the federal securities
law.110 The appeals court here should assume that the Supreme Court may similarly review the "judge-made rules" upon which the prosecutor relies.
And finally, of course, virtually all of the cited precedent and legislation-indeed the
very structure of the relevant discussion from which the precedent and legislation
emerge-were based on frames of reference that have all but disappeared because of technological change. The very notion of the "location" of data, and the link between such
location and all-important principles, such as personal privacy and national sovereignty,
has fundamentally changed. As the panel noted during oral argument, these profound
changes call for congressional action, but in the meantime, the courts must deal with

them."'
B.

A

NUANCED APPROACH

Any ruling by the Court of Appeals will risk mischief if it attempts a simple "one rule
fits all" rule, including either of those proposed by the parties. While there is an obvious
need for administrative simplicity, the following procedures would not overburden the
wheels of justice; they are far more likely to yield results that would be viewed outside the
United States as consistent with international law-and thus would not cause an undue
risk of retaliation.
If a prosecutor or other governmental authority seeks information stored as data, it can
proceed using any of the SCA procedures according to the circumstances. An ISP receiving a subpoena, court order or warrant may resist compliance on the grounds that the data
sought are located exclusively outside the United States only upon a showing that:
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Kiohel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664 (internal quotations omitted).
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
See, e.g., In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
Ely, supra note 1.
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1) There is an objective basis to believe that the Host Country may have an actual and
valid interest in the data stored there, which may entail a showing that (a) the account holder is a verified citizen or resident of that country, and/or (b) the use of the
account has been predominantly in the host country; and,
2) The host country in question has a demonstrably acceptable record working cooperatively with the United States through MLATs, international treaties, or other
arrangements.
The prosecutor can rebut this by showing that:
1) There is objective basis to believe that the account holder actively used the account
as part of a criminal act and while in the territory of the United States; or
2) There is an objective basis to believe that, while outside the United States, the account holder actively used the account as part of a criminal act that was intended to,
and foreseeably will, have a material effect in the United States; or
3) The host country in fact is not cooperating effectively with the United States; or
4) There is a special emergency where recourse to bilateral cooperation would be
ineffective.
Overlapping territorial jurisdictions, or "concurrent jurisdiction," is not a new concept.
The paradigm example from the infamous S.S. Lotus case of two ships, flying the flags of
different nations and colliding in international waters, shows that such occurrences were
possible even without modern data processing and storage techniques.11 2 In that case,
both France and Turkey had territorial jurisdiction over their own ships, as extensions of
their respective territories, so either country could have adjudicated the dispute.11 3 In
today's context, just because the United States may assert territorial jurisdiction over an
ISP within its territory should not deprive Ireland or any country where data are found of
the power to regulate or protect data found on their servers. But where ship collisions
were a relatively rare occurrence, modern data storage techniques will frequently implicate concurrent jurisdiction as companies make use of remote data processing sites.
A legal framework that accounts for modern data storage practices must do more than
inquire into whether a state has the power to compel data disclosure. And finding common ground requires a nuanced understanding of how the core issues may be viewed
elsewhere. As the Microsoft case shows, U.S. analysis tends to focus on the police powers
relating to the place where data are stored; a European analysis is likely to focus on the
rights of the individual whose data are involved.11 4 Any successful long term solution
must meet the requirements of comity by balancing the legitimate interests of the countries that may be affected by the exercise of that power.
A very recent decision of the European Union's highest court, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), while not directly applicable to the Microsoft case, reflects very different
112. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10.
113. Id. at 30-31.
114. For example, in June 2015, the French database protection agency known as the CNIL (Commission
Nationale de 'Informatiqueet des Liberts) announced that in order to protect the "right to be forgotten" as that
right is viewed in France, Google must eliminate links relating to complaining French citizens-even on
servers located in, and primarily accessed from, the United States. See JEREMY FEIGELSON ET AL.,
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON,

LLP, A NEw RULING BY THE FRENCH DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITY: IS THE

RIGHT To BE FORGOTTEN CROSSING THE ATLANTIC TO THE U.S.? (2015), http://www.debevoise.com/~/
media/files/insights/publicatons/2015/06/20150624a.frenchdatsaprotecon.pdf
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appreciations of data sovereignty between the United States and Europe, the sensitivity of
relations on those issues, and the economic and diplomatic interests at stake.

In a

landmark decision handed down on October 6, 2015, the ECJ invalidated a European
Commission decision that had generally facilitated transfer of data between Europe and
the United States by providing blanket protection under so-called "Safe Harbor" principles negotiated with the United States Department of Commerce."

5

The plaintiff is an

Austrian citizen who had a Facebook account with Facebook's subsidiary in Ireland, and
whose data were apparently subject to transfer from Ireland to the United States by
Facebook. He complained that the U.S. Safe Harbor principles did not provide sufficient
assurances for the protection of his personal data upon transfer, citing in particular the
June 2013 disclosures by Edward Snowden. The ECJ agreed, noting in particular that the
Safe Harbor rules appeared to be subject to overbroad exceptions permitting access to
transferred data by security and law enforcement officials in the United States, and because the United States provided insufficient opportunities to the owners of such data to
obtain redress against such intrusions. The actual effect of this ruling is complicated; the

extent to which it will actually inhibit trans-Atlantic transfers of data and possibly disadvantage U.S.-based ISPs, such as Facebook, remains to be seen. 116 But it is impossible to
read the decision without anticipating a negative reaction to a blanket permission permitting U.S. authorities to obtain any and all data stored in Europe, without even providing
notice that they are doing so, in any case where an entity that has access to such data is
subject to U.S. jurisdiction-the same position requested by the prosecutor in this case.
The approach presented here allows for efficient service of non-controversial SCA
"warrants", when their application appears to be purely domestic or where identifiable
U.S. interests clearly predominate, while providing a mechanism for ISPs like Microsoft
to show that, in a particular case, there is a treaty process, which is the more appropriate
procedural device because of the apparent legitimate interest of the host country and its
history of compliance with applicable cooperation treaties or agreements. Whatever solution is eventually adopted in the Second Circuit will be judged by the rest of the world on
how well it conforms to comity and the principles of international law.

115. Case C-362/14, Maxmilillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, INFOCURIA (Oct. 6, 2015),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfltext=&docid= 169195&doclang=en.
116. See DR. THOMAS SCHURRLE, ET AL., DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, LLP, TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL
DATA TO THE UNITED STATES: EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE RULES THE SAFE HARBOUR PROTOCOL IS

INVALID (2015), http://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2015/10/transfers-of-personal-data-to-the-united-states.
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